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RE: Colman v. Utah State Land Board, No. 860331 
Reply to State Respondents' Third Citation of New 
Authority 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
This letter is submitted in response to the State's 
third citation of new authority in accordance with rule 24(j) 
of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
The State has cited the Court to the California 
Appeals Court decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 
1353, 258 Cal. Rptr. 898 (Cal. App. 1989) in support of its 
position that, as a matter of law, Colman has not stated a 
claim for a taking of private property. This decision, which 
is the result of the Supreme Court's remand, adds nothing to 
the arguments previously presented by the parties in Colman. 
In First English, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987) 
the United States Supreme Court addressed two issues. First, 
the Court held that monetary damages can be sought for inverse 
condemnation based on unconstitutional regulatory takings. 
Second, and more important for this case, the Supreme Court 
held that a temporary taking is compensable under the just 
compensation clause. 107 S. Ct. at 3141. The Supreme Court 
remanded the case for the California courts to determine 
whether the temporary land use regulation at issue resulted in 
a temporary taking of the plaintiff's property. 
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On remand, the California Court of Appeals held that 
there was no taking because the regulation did not deprive the 
plaintiff of "all use" of its property. First English (Cal.), 
258 Cal Rptr. at 904-05. The court found that the plaintiff 
was left with several of its contemplated uses throughout the 
term of the interim ordinance challenged by the plaintiff. Id. 
at 904. 
Colman's factual basis for a taking is substantially 
different than First English. First, the Lutheran Church in 
First English alleged a regulatory taking. Colman, however, 
alleges a physical occupation of his property, which is a 
taking per se. Colman's Supp. Brief at 36. Alternatively, 
Colman alleges that he has been deprived of all beneficial use 
of his property. Colman's Supp. Brief at 37-38. 
The record in this case does not provide a basis for 
this Court ruling that Colman has not been deprived of all use 
of his land as he alleges. Physical occupation or deprivation 
of all beneficial use of the property, even if only temporary, 
is a compensable taking. Colman Supp. Brief at 36-38. The 
determination of whether there is a "physical invasion," 
"substantial impairment" or "peculiar injury" constituting a 
compensable taking is a question of fact for the trial court. 
Colman Supp. Brief at 23-24. The California Appeals Court 
decision in First English does not alter this conclusion nor 
provide a basis for this court ruling that Colman has not 
stated a claim as a matter of law. 
Although the California court may have correctly ruled 
that there was no taking in First English because the plaintiff 
was not deprived of its beneficial use of the property, the 
court's discussion is questionable in two respects. First, the 
California court has, like many others, confused the state's 
police power and eminent domain power. See Colman's Supp. 
Brief at 8-13. As the State points out in its letter, the 
California court stated that the disputed "zoning restrictions 
represent a valid exercise of police power and not an 
unconstitutional 'taking without compensation.'" The validity 
of the exercise of the state's police power is a question of 
due process, not just compensation. A proper exercise of the 
police power (e.g. a valid regulation), however, may still 
require compensation under the taking clause: 
[A] basic understanding of the [Fifth] Amendment 
makes clear that it is designed not to limit the 
governmental interference with property rights 
per se, but rather to secure compensation in the 
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event of otherwise proper interference amounting 
to a taking. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 
2384-85; Colman's Supp. Brief at 12. 
Colman does not claim that the State's decision to 
breach the causeway was an invalid exercise of its police power 
in violation of the due process clause. His claim is that this 
otherwise proper interference with his property requires 
compensation under the just compensation clause of the Utah and 
United States Constitutions. 
Second, the California First English case suggests 
that the State can take property without just compensation to 
the extent that the regulation is necessary to preserve public 
safety. Because the California court held that plaintiff was 
not deprived of all use of its property, this statement is 
dicta. (For an analysis of the public safety and emergency 
argument, please see Colman's Supp. Brief at 46-50.) It is 
important to note that the public safety rationale approved by 
the court was the protection of human lives, not property. 
First English (Cal.), 258 Cal. Rptr. at 895, 901-02. In 
Colman, the State breached the causeway to protect property, 
not human life. Finally, the California court specifically 
found that First English presented a "dramatic illustration of 
the principle of 'reciprocity of advantage'" iQ. at 905. No 
such reciprocity is present in Colman. Colman Supp. Brief at 
35-36. 
For these reasons, and as more fully set forth in 
Colman's Supplemental Brief, the trial court's ruling that 
there was no taking in Colman should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted. 
Carol Clawson 
cc: R. Douglas Credille, Esq. 
L. Ridd Larson, Esq. 
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